behavioural transgressions rather than institutional defects. Justice would thus be fundamentally linked to how people live and not merely to the nature of the surrounding institutions. In the approach set out by Sen (2009) in The Idea of Justice, therefore, "it is argued that there are some crucial inadequacies in this overpowering concentration on institutions (where behaviour is assumed to be appropriately compliant), rather than on the lives that people are able to lead" (SEN, 2009, p. xi) .
As we may already observe, these three differences -which the author himself looks to present and distinguish (see, for example, SEN 2011a, pp. 11-14, 39-57) -are strongly interconnected or even overlap, and generate as their primary outcome the elaboration of a theoretical formulation centred on people's real lives, on the realizations and accomplishments in comparisons of justice. As a consequence, there is a clear shift in terms of the central subject of social justice compared to the theory of justice formulated by Rawls (1999a) -a movement with implications for both the scope and the nature of the idea of social justice. For Sen (2009) , the principles of justice need to be focused directly on the lives and freedoms of the people involved, conferring institutions an instrumental role in the pursuit of justice. According to the Indian theorist, when choosing between the justice involved in two situations, institutions should come into the reckoning in relation to the direct contribution made to the lives of people are able to lead, "facilitating our ability to scrutinize the values and priorities that we can consider" (SEN, 2009, p. xii) , thereby promoting opportunities for the public debate.
In the present article I propose that, when considered from a liberalegalitarian viewpoint, Sen's proposal (2009) to change the primary subject of social justice appears mistaken. Pursuing a Rawlsian perspective 1 , I argue that the primordial subject of social justice is the basic structure of society and that Sen's (2009) critique of Rawls's (1999a) theory of justice -with special emphasis on the _____________________________________________________________________________ 1 Here I use the term 'Rawlsian perspective' because I present a set of ideas centred on particular aspects of the theory of justice formulated by John Rawls in this article. The arguments that I present here are thus affiliated with a 'Rawlsian theory of justice'. In this article, I do not propose to expound on John Rawls's theory in full. I align my approach with a particular way of exploring normative theory practiced, among others, by Brian Barry (1995) (a specific argument on this question is found in BARRY, 1995, pp. xi-xii) . Along with the works of Rawls (1999a Rawls ( , 1999b Rawls ( , 2001 Rawls ( , 2005 , I make particular use of the theoretical developments presented by Scheffler (2006) and Freeman (2014) .
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questions of an adequate argumentative approach and the appropriate subject of social justice -is thus erroneous. The argument proceeds in four steps. To begin with (Section I) I sketch some of the central points of Sen's critiques and formulations (2009) as reflected in his decision to reject Rawls's approach (1999a) -in his view, a theory of justice concentrated solely on identifying perfectly just institutional arrangements -and present a distinct line of argument concerning justice, centred on "comparisons of real realizations".
Subsequently, (Section II) I present a particular understanding of the main subject of social justice in John Rawls's theory (1999a) , the basic structure of society. I argue that the adoption of this subject of justice is directly associated with a liberal-egalitarian conception of social justice, outlining a particular understanding of the primary subject of social justice in Rawls. In conducting this interpretative exercise, I look to show how Sen's reading (2009) of Rawls's work is in large part superficial.
In Section III, I look to show that the strong critique undertaken by Sen (2009) of the redundancy of theories of perfect justice can be deemed implausible.
Finally, in Section IV I briefly highlight some of the points raised earlier and draw a number of final considerations.
Section I
In presenting his formulation of justice, Sen (2009) 
aligns his approach
with what he delineates as "a variety of comparative approaches that were concerned with social realizations" (SEN, 2009, p. 07 In contrast with the insistence in Rawlsian 'justice as fairness', the alternative of a 'social choice' approach (to which my own theory broadly belongs) allow the possibility of a plurality of competing principles -or more exactly a plurality of bundles of combined priorities over acceptable principles -after subjecting them all to critical examination (SEN, 2011b, p. 323 The importance of human lives, experiences and realizations cannot be supplanted by information about institutions that exist and the rules that operate. Institutions and rules are, of course, very important in influencing what happens, and they are part and parcel of actual world as well, but the realized actuality goes well beyond the organizational picture, and includes the lives that people manage -or do not manageto live (SEN, 2009, p.18 ).
As we know, Sen's theoretical approach defends the importance of the real capabilities that people can have as an adequate measure of social justice, as well as the defence -at least prima facie -of the huge importance of the freedom to choose from among the different kinds of life that a person could have.
Section II
Seeking to contribute to the rich debate set off by the publication of Sen's work (2009) , I shall present a particular understanding of the primary subject of social justice formulated by Rawls (1999a Rawls ( , 2001 Rawls ( , 2005 -the basic structure of society -seeking to show, through an analysis of this concept, how the critical line justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 03) . A few pages later, the philosopher clearly sets out both the central importance of social justice to his theory and the main subject of this justice:
namely, the basic structure of society. As the author declares: "Our topic, however, is that of social justice. For us the primary subject of justice is the basic structure of society, or more exactly, the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 06).
Later, in Conference VII of Political Liberalism, John Rawls (2005) refines and develops his understanding of the basic structure as a primary subject of justice. Even more clearly than in A Theory of Justice, in this text Rawls defines the basic structure of society. In his words:
The basic structure is understood as the way in which the major social institutions fit together into one system, and how they assign fundamental rights and duties and shape the division of advantages that arises through social cooperation. Thus the political constitution, the legally recognized forms of property, and the organization of economy, and the nature of the family, all belong to the basic structure of society (RAWLS, 2005, p. 258 ).
Hence, a contractualist conception of justice assumes the basic structure of society as the primary subject of justice and this "conception of justice that results has a certain regulative primacy with respect to the principles and standards appropriate for the others cases" (RAWLS, 2005, pp. 257-258) . The core objective of a theory of justice should thus be the formulation of first principles that offer 261). In Rawls's theory, these principles are limited to prescribing that "the basic structure establish certain equal basic liberties for all and make sure that social and economic inequalities work for the greatest benefit of the last advantaged against a background of fair opportunity" (RAWLS, 2005, p. 261) .
Diverging then from the supposed universal scope of the principle of utility, the first principles of justice as fairness do not offer reasonable and direct guidelines for many cases and subjects that can be subject to ethical evaluation, such as, for instance, the internal practices of the Churches 3 . Rawls (2011) leaves the reader in no doubt that the two principles of justice do not apply to this case directly, asserting that the most that we can say concerning the associationswhich include, for example, the Churches -that exist within a basic structure of society is that these must adapt to the requirements that this structure imposes to guarantee background justice (RAWLS, 2011, p. 310) .
However, the absence of first general principles cannot be considered a synonym of an unsystematic social contract theory. Rawls (2005) proposes an appropriate sequence of kinds of subjects, with the parties in the social contract _____________________________________________________________________________ 3 I think it is a mistake to associate the theory formulated by Rawls (1999a) with the direct application of the two principles of justice to specific subjects, such as particular institutions, or as a solution to questions of 'local justice' present in part of the Brazilian literature at least. As Vita (2004) correctly argues: "Principles of justice that apply to basic institutional arrangements ('global justice') may not be appropriate for deciding what the right thing to do is in specific decision-making contexts ('local justice'); for example, deciding the criteria for distributing organs for transplants" (Vita, 2004 (Vita, , p. 1150 . In other words, general principles of social and political justice may not be adequate (and should not be directly applied) to specific decision-making contexts relating to urgent problems involving acute ethical divergences. These principles of social justice in general constrain (or limit) the principles of local justice, but they are not the same, nor do they determine them in an unequivocal way. This question is briefly examined later in the present article.
proceeding in accordance with this established sequence 4 . As Freeman (2014) reminds us, "there is an 'appropriate sequence' of determination of principles from the point of view of original position, with the principles of social justice determined first" (FREEMAN, 2014, p. 92) . Furthermore, the underlying unity [of contract theory] is provided by the idea that free and equal moral persons are to construct reasonable and helpful guidelines for moral reflection in view of their need for such organizing principles and the role in social life that these principles and their corresponding subjects are presumed to have (RAWLS, 2005, p. 262) .
What I think needs to be emphasized, therefore, is that Rawls (1999a Rawls ( , 2005 , by affirming that the primary subject of social justice 5 is the basic structure of society, is making a complex normative choice that involves various subjacent theoretical aspects. It seems to me that neither Sen's critique (2009) of the theoretical approach developed by Rawls, nor a significant portion of the critiques of the subject of Rawlsian justice, take these important sets of theoretical aspects into account. Instead, they mistakenly caricature Rawls's contractualist proposal (1999a) and consequently present a critique (and a subsequent proposal for correcting/altering the subject of social justice) based on this initial error.
As I indicated above, by asserting that the principles of social justice focus on the basic structure of society, Rawls (2005) posits firstly that (i) there is a plurality of first principles of justice that apply to different subjects and institutions, such that the principles of justice for the basic institutions/basic structure possess a 'regulatory primacy' over these other principles. In other words:
_____________________________________________________________________________ 4 "…with the understanding that the principles of each later agreement are to be subordinate to those of all earlier agreements, or else adjusted to them by certain priority rules" (RAWLS, 2005, p. 262; 2011, p. 310) . 5 In Justice as Fairness, Rawls (2001) makes a change in asserting that "one main feature of justice as fairness is that it takes the basic structure as the primary subject of political justice" (RAWLS, 2001, p. 10, my emphasis) . Nonetheless, in the same paragraph the author states that "our focus is almost entirely on the basic structure as the subject of political and social justice"(RAWLS, ibid, my emphasis). Lesser associations within the basic structure of society have standards of local justice peculiar to their purposes and role, and these are not determined by principles of justice for the basic structure. Nonetheless, these associations must adjust their requirements of local justice to the requirements that the basic structure imposes in order to establish 'background justice' in society as a whole (FREEMAN, 2014, p. 92) .
Secondly (ii) within the contractualist structure of argumentation of Rawls's (1999a Rawls's ( , 2001 ) theory, the primacy of the basic structure implies a methodological priority of the principles of domestic justice (that apply to the basic structure of society 6 ) over the other principles of justice, whether these involve We cannot assume, then, that the principles of justice appropriate for the basic structure of society are also able to serve to regulate individual conduct in general. As Scheffler (2006) asserts apropos the latter,
[t]he principles of individual conduct must address the full range of moral requirements and permissions that apply to us as individuals. They must clarify the nature of our obligations and natural duties, and _____________________________________________________________________________ they must address a wide variety of topics including supererogation, mutual aid, and personal virtues such as benevolence, courage, and mercy (SCHEFFLER, 2006, p. 103 ).
Moreover, a Rawlsian theory of justice would argue that certain principles for individual conduct are an essential part of a conception of justice since these principles specify how individuals conduct their actions (and themselves) in relation to just institutions. For Rawls (1999a) , citizens need to possess a strong and normally effective sense of justice. At the very least, his theory contains a principle of fairness that applies to individuals -one that posits that we are responsible for all our willingly contracted obligations -and a principle that governs the natural duty of justice 7 . Given that the principles of justice relating to the basic structure are primary, they also have an important indirect influence on individual responsibilities and motivations. The principles for individuals are to some extent dependent, therefore, on the principles of the basic structure (due to the appropriate sequence indicated above) and the personal obligations and duties presume an idea of just institutions, with the content of the latter needing to be defined prior to the direct demands placed on individuals (SCHEFFLER, 2006, p.
04).
But what reason would exist for limiting the primary focus of social justice to the basic structure of society? As Rawls (1999a) expounds, there are three main reasons for this approach. The basic structure is the primary subject of justice because (i) its effects are deep and present from the outset; (ii) it influences and gives shape to wishes, desires, aspirations and even the character that individuals come to possess, and, finally, (iii) it assures the maintenance of background justice, the necessary conditions of the just background.
The consequences of the basic structure are profound and present from the outset (RAWLS, 2008, p. 08; 2001, p. 10) , since the social conditions in which we develop as individuals -including our relative positions and the means and _____________________________________________________________________________ 7 As Rawls (1999a) elaborates, one of the basic natural duties from the viewpoint of justice as fairness is the duty of justice. This duty "requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and apply to us. It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves. Thus if the basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme" (RAWLS, 1999a, p. 99). While the observation that 'society' generates effects on individuals is virtually irrefutable, Rawls's astute originality lies in shifting generic responsibility for these influences from a vague concept ('society') to the specific institutions necessary for social cooperation, which comprise the basic structure of society.
Furthermore, it is the profound influence that these basic institutions exert on individuals -conceived as free and moral persons with fundamental interests in exercising their moral faculties -that justify the primacy attributed to the basic structure of society (FREEMAN, 2014, p. 95) . In Rawls's theory (1999a), people's interests and wishes are partially determined by the basic structure, meaning that they cannot be considered as the ultimate entity justifying choices. As Scheffler Consequently there is a close link between the non-consequentialist contractualist approach formulated by Rawls (1999a) , his conception of personhood and his conception of society understood in terms of social cooperation and reciprocity. As Freeman (2014) As Rainer Forst (2014) aptly points out, the concept of social cooperation performs a central role in the Rawlsian approach, which distinguishes Rawls's (1999a) conception of procedural justice from a conception of libertarian justice 9 .
As the German philosopher avers:
Rawls's conception of 'procedural justice' is geared to social relations and structures such that it leads to a system of social relations and structures such that it leads to a system of social cooperation which express the "sociability of human being" in such a way that they complement each other in productive ways and participate in a context of cooperation which includes all as politically and socially autonomous members (FORST, 2014, p. 32) .
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It is precisely because of this particular understanding of justice that in Rawls's (1999a) theory the ideal of free and equal moral persons is achieved only when society and individuals respect the basic rights of everyone and willingly meet the demands set by the basic social institutions, the latter regulated by principles unanimously agreed by these rational and reasonable persons (that is, by the parties that represent it) in the original position. Hence a close connection exists in Rawls's (1999a) work between the ideal of moral person and political society (of Kantian origin) and the basic structure defended as a main subject of justice by the author 10 . The basic structure can be understood as 'the institutional expression' of these latter ideals. As Rawls (2005) to respond to problems of choice inherent to the 'social system', or, in other words, questions relating to the definition of basic social institutions. In Rawls's (1999a) theory, then, distribution cannot be considered to be just when the final outcomes _____________________________________________________________________________ 10 A particular conception of person (and consequently of the social unit) is also directly associated with Rawls's defence (and definition) of the list of primary goods as an adequate measure of distributive justice (RAWLS, 1999b) . It seems to me that neither Sen (2009) nor other critics take this connection into account, proposing instead other goods to be distributed without constructing a necessary argument. 11 The case to which I refer is 'Three children and a flute' (SEN, 2009, pp. 15) . In this illustrative case we have to decide which of three children with different claims and preferences (defended by distinct independent principles of justice) should keep the flute that they are fighting over. Precisely because of this particular comprehension of distributive justice, the focus on the basic structure of society is also a necessary element in maintaining background justice. One of the fundamental roles of (economic and legal) institutions is to establish and sustain background justice, providing certain necessary equitable conditions for the actions of individuals and associations. As
Rawls (2005) asserts:
Regarding specifically the illustrative case (of the three children and a flute), the proposal presented by Sen (2009) can be considered one of allocative justice since in this case the central question to which the author looks to respond -or show the impossibility of a single response -is "who should keep the flute". We have an existing good (a flute) and three individuals (the children) claiming an interest in possessing this good on the basis of independent principles of justice (such as knowing how to play it, being the poorest, or having made the flute). We could, then, associate this question presented in Sen's example with the formulations of allocative justice, which seek to respond to the question of what people should receive in accordance with an independent parameter of justice (see FORST, 2014, p. 33) . Distinct from a Rawlsian conception of procedural justice, centred on the question of who individuals are, conceptions of allocative justice set out from the premise of the existence of scarce goods that should be distributed to people in a just way -based on independent parameters of justice -without ultimately questioning the mainstays of distributive justice, such as the institutions of a society in general, the structures of production and distribution, and social organisation. 13 Sen (2009) , defending his proposal of 'comprehensive outcomes', avoids considering it a consequentialist philosophical theory, emphasizing the strong critiques directed at these theories in the contemporary literature. However, as the author himself stresses, there is a particular 'consequential reasoning' in his proposal of 'comprehensive outcomes'. This 'consequential reasoning' appears in the ideas of responsibility and responsible choice that his theory incorporates and advocates (SEN, 2009, pp. 217-219) . In his words: "It is, however, important to see that consequence-sensitive reasoning is necessary for an adequately broad understanding of the idea of responsibility. This has to be a part of the discipline of responsible choice, based on the chooser's evaluation of states of affairs, including consideration of all the relevant consequences viewed in the light of the choices made and the comprehensive outcomes associated with what happens as a result" (SEN, 2009, p. 218) . 14 "Therefore, if it is asked in the abstract whether one distribution of a given stock of things to definite individuals with known desires and preferences is more just than another, then there is simply no answer to the question" (RAWLS, 2005, p. 282) .
The subject of social justice: a defence of the basic structure of society
Unless this structure is appropriately regulated and adjusted, an initial just social process will eventually cease to be just, however free and fair particular transactions may look when viewed by themselves.
[…] Again, the conditions necessary for background justice can be undermined, even though nobody acts unfairly or is aware of how the overall result of many separate exchanges affects the opportunities of others (RAWLS, 2005, p. 266) .
It follows that certain rules applicable to economic agents in their everyday transactions (as a means to avoid subsequent undesirable distributions)
would, in Rawls's view (2011) , be excessive, if not simply impossible. Hence we need special institutions to preserve background justice, accompanied by a special conception of justice that defines how these institutions are to be structured (RAWLS, 2011, p. 317) .
As the author reminds us, "the rules governing agreements and individual
transactions cannot be to complex, or require too much information to be correct applied" (RAWLS, 2005, p. 267) , bearing in mind the high costs imposed on any transaction. Hence, as stated earlier, Rawls (2005) proposes a division of work between rules pertaining to the basic structure and the rules and norms that apply directly to individuals and associations (RAWLS, 2005, p. 268; SCHEFFLER, 2006, pp. 107-108) . In the eyes of the philosopher, "any contract theory must recognize that a division of labour is necessary between the operations of the basic structure in maintaining background justice and the definition and enforcement by the legal system of the rules that apply directly to individuals and associations, and govern their particular transactions" (RAWLS, 2005, p. 288) .
In contrast to an erroneous reading that considers Rawls's (1999a Rawls's ( , 2005 theory to exempt individuals entirely from onerous responsibilities for assuring social justice, this moral division of work corresponds to a form of pluralism concerning moral values and principles. Rawls's (1999a Rawls's ( , 2005 theory presupposes the latter in accepting the diversity of incommensurable and tolerable conceptions of good and (comprehensive and reasonable) moral and religious doctrines that potentially exist in a liberal democratic society. As Scheffler (2006) explains: " The idea is not that there no moral principles that regulates individual conduct, so that field is clear for the unrestricted pursuit of self-interest, but rather that the principles for the basic structure do not supersede the complex and varied principles and values that apply to individuals" (SCHEFFLER, 2006, p. 107) . The point to be emphasized, then, is that the principles of justice in Rawls's (1999a) theory are not conceived as direct or general guidelines for individual conduct, which does not exempt individuals from responsibilities of justice.
Section III
As argued previously, Sen (2009) First of all, it should be emphasized that Sen's (2009) But, as Kamm (2011) elaborates, a comparison between art and justice would be misguided:
There are no general rules or principles by which to create or to judge a work of art such that we can be sure that an artwork that does not abide by these rules or principles is less good than one that does. If there are importance (COHEN, 2003) .
In contrast to Sen's (2009) critical diagnosis, though, the idea of a perfectly just society functions as a regulatory and thus non-redundant ideal. Moreover, as
Satz (2012) stresses, "the drive for a 'perfect' theory actually arises from within our everyday comparative and evaluative thinking about what we should do in the context of complicated cases" (SATZ, 2012, p. 284) . Given this fact, it can be presumed that "the line between comparative assessment and ideal theorizing is less sharp […] than Sen takes it to be" (SATZ, 2012, p. 284) .
As Satz (2012) argues, an ideal theory also provides us with a point towards which we can aim and by which we can evaluate our progress, thereby performing a valuable role in the process of reflecting on existing injustices (SATZ, 2012, p. 285) . Additionally, the decisions stemming from a comparative (non-ideal) approach may, in my view, betray a temporal inconsistency -something that occurs when the option for the best policy in t0 for a future time t1 is no longer the best policy when t1 is reached -whether this is caused by a hyperbolic discounting,
In this article I adopt a particular theoretical position, in defence of ideal theories of justice, on which no consensus exists in the contemporary literature. A contrary position is presented, for instance, by Young (1990) .
an unforeseen strategic interaction, or path-dependency 16 . In other words, without an optimal point on the basis of which we can evaluate our actions and choices, we end up drifting along with circumstances, ultimately unable to know whether our actions work diachronically to reduce mundane injustices. Finally, an approach limited to ranking available alternatives through a comparative method is at risk of overlooking unpresented possible choices.
It seems to me that a strictly comparative approach would confront problems only solvable through the help of ideal theories, including the theory of justice as fairness presented by Rawls (1999a Rawls ( , 2001 . Consequently, I conclude that contemporary theories of justice dedicated to presenting ideal considerations of justice are not redundant as Sen (2009) insists.
Even accepting that the main purpose of a theory of justice is to function as a guide to action, the accusation that a theory like Rawls's fails to provide such a guide proves unfounded. As states: "the claim that a society is (or can be) perfectly just says something important about both the nature of the value of justice, and how to orient our actions in the real world" (VALENTINI, 2011, p. 305 (2000) suggests, "the preference reversal involved in time-inconsistency is not caused by exogenous and unforeseen changes in the environment, nor by a subjective change in the agent over and above the reversal itself. The reversal is caused by the mere passage of time" (ELSTER, 2000, p. 24) . Other points deserving a more detailed analysis from the approach advocated by Sen (2009) are the questions of subjective changes of preferences and adaptive preferences. 17 For a similar angle on this question, see , especially section 4.2. In contrast to some readings that look to reconcile the theoretical position outlined by Sen (2009) As I suggested above, Sen (2009) rejects as a whole the contractualist (and constructivist) perspective of justice presented by Rawls(1999a) , in which it would be possible, through a fair and impartial process, to select principles of justice applicable to the basic structure of society. In my view, this complete epistemic rejection of the way in which Rawls's (1999a) theory is constructed has the inevitable consequence of discarding the enormous normative contributions offered by Rawls's (1999a) theory of justice. However, this radical step -which in my view would be inevitable were we to take Sen's (2009) critique seriously -is one that the author himself (Sen, 2011b) On the other hand, and at the risk of repeating myself, I stress that if we accept the critical part of Sen's (2009) theoretical formulation, we are compelled to abandon entirely -something that Sen (see 2011b) himself avoids -a 'transcendental' theory of justice of the kind developed by Rawls (1999a) when we seek to make comparisons of justice. If the solutions and principles of justice presented by Rawls (1999a) are legitimate and normatively correct in the eyes of the advocates of 'comparative theories', it is up to them to present a new way of constructing and defending these normative positions independently from the argument expounded by Rawls (1999a) .
In rejecting a contractualist conception of justice as fairness, we are also obliged to reject one of its essential characteristics, namely the tenet that the basic structure of society is the primary subject of social justice, as well as its main outcomes and normative recommendation. In my view, this rejection appears unfounded.
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